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n October 2009, the lion’s share of media and 
political attention given to the ratification process 
of the Lisbon Treaty in the Czech Republic has 
been devoted to the antics of the President, Václav 
Klaus. However, it is important to point out that the 
process is being delayed not only by the President’s 
reservations and requests for a Czech (quasi)opt-out 
from the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also 
by the pending review of the Treaty by the Czech 
Constitutional Court (CCC), which is set to give a 
second ruling on the Lisbon Treaty on November 3
rd, 
having delivered its first decision in autumn 2008.  
The constitutional framework of the CCC 
review 
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic is 
vested with the power to review the compatibility of 
international treaties signed by the Czech state with 
the Czech Constitutional order. The review(s) of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and 2009 are the first 
substantial procedures of this kind performed by the 
Constitutional Court (all other previous submissions 
have been rejected by the CCC on procedural 
grounds).  
The Constitution provides for three separate ‘windows 
of opportunity’, depending upon the group of 
applicants to initiate the review procedure. One 
window opens for the Assembly or Deputies and the 
Senate at the moment the government requests 
approval of the international treaty in question and 
closes at the moment the particular parliamentary 
chamber approves the treaty. Another window of 
opportunity opens for a group of senators or deputies 
after ‘their’ chamber approves the treaty in question. 
This window closes the moment the President 
completes the ratification process with his/her 
signature. In practice, it was this latter option that has 
been invoked by a group of 17 Czech senators who 
submitted the motion to the CCC shortly before the 
second Irish referendum.  
The third actor who can initiate a review by the CCC 
is the President of the Republic. His/her window 
opens at the moment when both parliamentary 
chambers approve the treaty and closes when s/he 
completes the ratification process by adding his 
signature. The relative lateness of the presidential 
window in the whole process was one the reasons why 
President Klaus did not challenge the constitutionality 
of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe; 
that treaty did not even reach the parliamentary phase 
in the Czech Republic. He did, however, send an open 
letter to the Chairman of the CCC, Mr. Rychetský, 
requesting his opinion on the constitutionality of the 
EU Constitutional Treaty, but the judge declined to 
respond.    
The first CCC review of the Lisbon Treaty 
On 13 December 2007, the Lisbon Treaty was signed 
on behalf of the Czech Republic by Prime Minister 
Mirek Topolánek and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Karel Schwarzenberg. The idea of a specific 
constitutional amendment, tailored to the Lisbon 
Treaty, was rejected and the government chose to use 
the constitutional Article 10a as the basis for the 
ratification. The Parliament was asked to approve the 
Lisbon Treaty in January 2008. In April 2008, the 
Senate stayed the approval procedure and asked the 
Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of 
the Lisbon Treaty.  
The first motion of the Senate was relatively brief and 
looked more like a political manifesto than a formal 
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legal document. The Senate’s submission questioned 
six elements of the Lisbon Treaty:   
-  the existence of the exclusive competencies of the 
European Union while the Czech Constitution 
permits, by means of Article 10a, the transfer only 
of “certain powers” to an international 
organisation;  
-  the flexibility clause in the Lisbon Treaty;  
-  the general passerelle clause and the specific 
passerelle clause in criminal law;   
-  the binding force of an international treaty 
concluded by the European Union (by a qualified 
majority in the Council) for the Czech Republic, 
regardless of Czech opposition to the treaty in the 
Council; 
-  possible conflict between the human rights 
provisions of the Charter of Fundamental 
Freedoms of the European Union and Czech 
constitutional human rights standards; and     
-  the EU sanctions regime against a member state 
that seriously and systematically violates human 
rights (Article 7 TEU), where the Senate feared 
that this regime could potentially lead to intense 
political pressure on the Czech state that would 
violate its sovereignty. 
The Constitutional Court delivered its opinion on 26 
November 2008. In a unanimous decision, the 
Constitutional Court found the Senate's objections 
against the constitutionality to be ill-founded. 
However, the Court made it very clear that that its 
decision on the Lisbon Treaty has not ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty in its 
complexity – what the Court said was only that the 
specific articles cited in the Senate's petition do not 
conflict with the Czech constitutional order.   
The CCC’s argumentation was based primarily on the 
evaluation of many features of the European Union 
that were challenged by the Senate as traditional or 
standard elements of the international cooperation. 
Further, the CCC finding of the constitutional 
conformity was built on the fact that the Czech 
Republic has control (due to unanimity required in the 
Council or the European Council) over the initiation 
of several procedures whose constitutionality was 
questioned. Regarding the parliamentary participation 
in the formulation of the Czech position in those 
affairs, the CCC ruled that the framework of the 
executive-parliamentary cooperation in this affair 
(such as the binding mandate) is not a constitutional 
question but one of political bargaining. The CCC’s 
decision also stated that the EU Charter shares the 
same human rights values as the Czech Charter and 
the risk of a conflict is thus minimal.  
For the future of the CCC’s review powers, even more 
important were the ‘horizontal’ aspects of the Court’s 
decision:  
-  the CCC answered only questions raised by the 
Senate and declared that the CCC review cannot go 
beyond the issues challenged in the particular 
applicant; 
-  Flexible reading of the res judicata principle by the 
CCC; 
-  Equal treatment is given to ordinary treaties and 
the treaties ratified under Art. 10a (EU Accession 
Treaty, ICC Treaty, Lisbon Treaty) regarding the 
review of the constitutionality performed by the 
CCC; and 
-  The CCC declared its readiness to hear 
constitutional complaints against the application of 
the Lisbon Treaty filed by individuals after the 
Lisbon Treaty enters into force. 
After the CCC’s ruling, the Lisbon Treaty was 
approved in both parliamentary chambers.  
The approval procedure was more complicated in the 
Senate where the key political club of the Civic 
Democratic Party was split in their support of the 
Treaty. The number of senators opposing the Lisbon 
Treaty was not high enough to block its approval in 
the Senate (60% of senators required) but sufficient to 
trigger the review procedure.  
The second motion to the CCC 
The second submission seems to be both more radical 
and more complex (over 40 pages of text) than the 
motion formulated by the whole Senate. The timing – 
just before the Irish referendum – was not accidental. 
One of the authors of the second submission 
acknowledged that one of the purposes of the motion 
is to provide the President, who is not allowed to 
complete the ratification process until the CCC 
decides, with extra time and to relieve him from 
political pressures.  
There are three layers to the senators’ motion: 
In the first layer, the senators claim that the whole 
Lisbon Treaty (and the Rome Treaty and Maastricht 
Treaty) conflicts with Art. 1 of the Czech 
Constitution, which states that “the Czech Republic is 
a sovereign, unitary and democratic, law-abiding 
State, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of 
man and citizen“ and with a ‘value neutrality’ clause 
in the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms (which is an integral part of the Czech 
constitutional order), which states that “democratic 
values constitute the foundation of the State, so that it 
may not be bound either by an exclusive ideology or 
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senators claim that the very structure and content of 
the Lisbon Treaty are vague, confusing, unclear and 
unpredictable to such an extent that it is incompatible 
with the principle of a law-abiding state. Further, the 
senators claim that the democratic character of the 
(Czech) state requires respect for the principle of the 
separation of powers and that the Lisbon Treaty (as 
well as the Maastricht and Rome Treaties) violates it 
by strengthening the position of the executive power 
in the Czech Republic (at the expense of the 
legislative branch). This problem might be addressed 
by the introduction of the ‘binding mandate’ for the 
Czech executive’s behaviour at the EU level (i.e. 
voting in the European Council and the Council of the 
EU) in all areas covered by the parliamentary power 
inside the Czech Republic. However, the present 
system contains the binding mandate only in 
‘exceptional’ situations, such as the use/activation of 
the passerelle clause by the European Council.    
The most radical objection of the senators is their 
claim that the transfer of the competences of the 
Czech state to the EU level under the Lisbon Treaty is 
too extensive and interferes with a ‘core sovereignty’ 
area that is non-transferable. In the senators’ opinion, 
the ‘untouchable’ domain includes the decision-
making on the income and expenditure of the Czech 
budget, deference to the Czech Republic, the 
definition of criminal offences, sanctions and the 
conditions of the criminal responsibility, guaranteeing 
the public order in the Czech Republic and decision-
making with exceptional/extraordinary impact on the 
cultural and social life of the Czech Republic. Since 
the Lisbon Treaty reaches into those domains, the 
transfer of powers in the Lisbon Treaty should be 
regarded as unconstitutional. Here, the senators’ 
motion explicitly quotes the “Lisbon-Judgment” of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court from this year.  
In the second layer of the senators’ motion, they 
formulate more objections to particular clauses in the 
Lisbon Treaty. The major line of argumentation is the 
vagueness of the rules contained in the Lisbon Treaty. 
The specific articles under challenge are as follows:  
-  The sanctions regime against a member state that is 
violating human rights under Art. 7 TEU  
-  The EU competence in the external relations with 
neighbouring countries (Art. 8 TEU) 
-  Representative democracy as the principle of the 
functioning of the EU 
-  Competencies of the European Commission, in 
particular the statement that “the Commission shall 
promote the general interest of the Union and take 
appropriate initiatives to that end“ 
-  “European commitment“ (evropanství) as a 
criterion for the selection of commissioners (Art. 
17 para.3 TEU)  
-  Mechanism of enhanced cooperation (Art 20 TEU) 
-  Promotion of an international system based on 
stronger multilateral cooperation and good global 
governance (Art. 21 para. 2 h TEU) as one of the 
tasks of the EU in the external relations. 
-  Common defence as one of the tasks of the 
European Union. 
-  Conditions for withdrawal from the European 
Union (Art. 50 TEU).  
In a third layer to their motion, the senators ask the 
CCC to make several declarations (to formulate 
several doctrines) related to the (non)application of 
the EU law in the Czech Republic and on the limits of 
European integration as such. Among others, the CCC 
is asked to declare:  
-  The binding mandate (formulated by the legislative 
power) of the government is an essential element 
of the reduction of the democratic deficit of the 
EU. The binding mandate shall be used also in the 
process of the selection of the (Czech) candidate 
for the European Commission or European Court 
of Justice.  
-  The CCC is the ultimate body responsible for the 
protection of the Czech Constitution and is ready 
to reject the application of EU law on Czech 
territory when it conflicts with the Czech 
constitutional order. In other words, the senators 
want to hear that the CCC is ready for a ‘Solange’ 
scenario (known from Germany in 1974-1986). 
Conclusions: Developments after the 
CCC judgment 
The CCC is expected to deliver its judgment on 
November 3
rd, but it is not likely to bring the Lisbon 
saga to a closure. In the aftermath of the Court’s 
judgment, the following events can be expected: 
-  Václav Klaus might initiate another review of the 
Lisbon Treaty by the CCC. His application could, 
for instance, concentrate specifically on the 
question of the Beneš decrees and the alleged 
(in)stability of the property regime after the Lisbon 
Treaty. In this case, the CCC is most likely to 
answer in the same tone as in its first Lisbon 
judgment – no finding of any constitutional 
violation in abstracto but (theoretically) being 
ready to hear a constitutional complaint from 
individuals whose property rights might be 
violated in the future. However, regardless of its 
outcome, the presidential motion to the CCC 
would definitely cause another delay in the 
ratification process in the Czech Republic.  
-  Václav Klaus has not explicitly promised that he 
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conflict between the Czech Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty. In the past, several analogous (but 
not the same) problems emerged when the absence 
of a deadline (the Czech Constitution does not set 
any deadline for the President to give his signature) 
or the absence of an explicit presidential duty to 
act in the constitutional text were interpreted in a 
very different way by various political actors. In 
practice, the President has usually resisted more 
restrictive interpretations of his competencies – for 
instance, for several years, Václav Klaus has 
ignored a decision of the Supreme Administrative 
Court to take action (to appoint or explicitly 
decline to appoint) with respect to a particular 
candidate for a judicial post. 
-  Several scenarios on how to tackle the (potential) 
presidential inactivity were debated in the Czech 
Republic (including the possibility of adopting a 
specific law or even a constitutional amendment) 
but  none  of them  has  yet  materialised.  Even if a  
specific ‘Lisbon’ legislative or constitutional measure 
is adopted in the future, it would be most likely 
followed by another reference to the CCC … and 
another delay in the ratification process.  
-  Recently, Klaus requested the adoption of a 
specific ‘Czech clause’ or ‘Czech opt-out’, which 
would limit the application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the Czech Republic, before 
he would ratify the Lisbon Treaty. The preferred 
format of the ‘Czech clause’ is far from clear at 
present but, on Friday October 23
rd, the President 
expressed optimism about the ongoing 
negotiations. Setting aside the legal consequences 
of the Czech clause for the EU-based obligations 
of the Czech state, its major effect might be 
symbolic. The Czech clause could provide Václav 
Klaus with a chance to ratify the Lisbon Treaty 
(and thus to avoid a serious constitutional crisis) 
while not (openly) exposing himself to domestic 
and external pressures to ratify unconditionally. 
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